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I.  INTRODUCTION
Economic models  describing interest group behavior and its
implications  for decision making and economic performance constitute
relatively new extensions  in the domain of economic theory.  Considerable
research effort has been focused on the  economic factors  that influence
interest groups to organize and pursue  favorable policy decisions. 1 Once
organized, the  interplay between interest groups may be understood in terms
of game strategy, which is  governed by the coordinating mechanisms inherent
in institutional arrangements. 2 Under certain conditions, transactions
costs are of a magnitude  that effectively stymies decision making.3
Natural resource economists have been quick to  adopt and utilize
particular aspects  of these  theories  in an applied context.  To  date, much
of  the literature has focused on the  self interested behavior of natural
resource managers as expressed through agency action.4 Rarely, however,
are  the full range of interests involved in natural resource decisions  and
their  interactions addressed.  Moreover, this theoretical base has never
been brought to bear on the most influential natural  resource policy
combination of our  time:  The National Environmental Policy Act  (NEPA) and
the Environmental  Impact Statement  (EIS) process.  NEPA and the EIS process
have received much attention, but not in the context of the  economic models
cited above. 5
The National Environmental Policy Act and the Environmental Impact
Statement process are  important subjects  for academic  inquiry because they
constitute the most pervasive natural  resource policy innovation in recentdecades.  This policy combination dominates substantive  outcomes  in natural
resource preservation and development.  Because the economic and
environmental tradeoffs involved are often substantial, decisions based on
the NEPA/EIS framework promise to have a significant influence on the
quality  of life  and choices open to both current and future generations.
The objective  of this paper  is  to  examine  the EIS process  in  the
context of game strategic behavior by interest groups and the  coordinating
function of decision rules.  The  transactions costs arising out  of existing
institutional arrangements are  of particular interest.  It is  important to
note from the outset  that  the analysis  focuses on the process guiding
decision making rather than the  substantive decisions arising out of the
EIS process.  Attention to process is  couched in the view that the
exceedingly complex and important substantive decisions made pursuant to
NEPA must not be  further encumbered by processes  that encourage
unproductive uses of information and human resources.
The format of the paper  is  as follows:  Section II  discusses  the
characteristics  of NEPA and the  EIS process that make them suitable for
analysis in terms  of interest group  theory.  In the  regard, a brief
background into  the purpose of NEPA and the evolution of the  EIS process
into participatory mechanism is  presented.
Section III of the paper provides  an overview of economic  theory that
predicts  the type of interest groups  likely to organize  and participate in
the  EIS process.  In general interest groups will not mirror  the general
public.  Section III also models  the distinct objectives of the  typical
range  of interests involved  in the EIS process.  It becomes clear the
problem is  one  of fundamental conflict  in value systems.
2In section IV,  the interplay of organized interest groups is
addressed.  The critical  role of uncertainty  in allowing game strategic
behavior to develop  is discussed.  Strategic use of information combined
with the veto power implicit in participatory decision making may produce
unprecedented transactions costs and threaten to stymie decision making.
Throughout sections III and IV the Metropolitan Denver Systemwide
Environmental Impact Statement (MDSEIS) is  used as an example  in order to
lend concreteness to  the  arguments set forth.  This case  is particularly
enlightening on the subject of transactions costs  since it has become  the
most costly and time consuming of its  kind in the history of the U.S.6
Section V concludes  the paper with an exploration of policy
implications.  A research agenda is  outlined that holds promise  in
determining institutional arrangements  capable of reducing transaction
costs and facilitating natural resource decisions pursuant  to NEPA.
II.  THE PARTICIPATORY NATURE OF THE EIS PROCESS
It  is clear  that the  intent of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969  is  to achieve balance among competing interests by requiring due
consideration of both economic and environmental  concerns in decision
making.7 That  is,  NEPA is concerned with the general'problem of fostering
compromise  rather than aimed at particular substantive outcomes.  This
period in natural resource policy lies well within the age  of scientific
management and rational planning.8 Accordingly, it was  generally believed
that solid information on environmental  effects,  gleaned from the EIS
process, would facilitate  such compromise.
In order to  facilitate the  EIS process as  an action forcing mechanism,
3and to rectify  the dubious ability of agencies for "self-policing",
Congress made the procedural provision that environmental agencies be
consulted and that their comments accompany a formal EIS. 9 In addition,
the threat of litigation was also sanctioned as  a procedural element  that
would promote due consideration of environmental effects  in  impact
assessment.  However as  stated by Dreyfus and Ingram:
"In the early years  of implementing the requirement for
impact statements  . . . developments occurred which transformed
them from a force operating from inside program administration
(as anticipated by the original drafters)  to a force exerted from
outside by interest groups and courts. "lO
The  EIS process became  infused with the reality of participatory
decision making.  Rather than being an explicit  intent of NEPA,
participatory decision making emerged on its  own accord.  The number of
parties  involved expanded beyond agency officials to very specific and
often fragmented interest groups.  Interest group activities,  rather than
being peripheral, have become central  to,  and may in fact dominate,  the  EIS
process.
The transformation of the  EIS process reflects a general move  toward
participatory decision making in the U.S.  Wengert argues that  the goal  of
participation has been alternatively characterized as  (1) good policy in
itself;  (2) strategically advantageous;  (3) essential  to  communication;  (4)
useful  in conflict resolution and  (5) therapeutic in rectifying social
alienation. 11 Despite  its role  in U.S. policy making, Wengert concludes
that there  is  no coherent body of theory that explains either  the normative
or  empirical significance of participatory decision making.
4The evolution of the  EIS process into a participatory framework means
inquiry into its  performance must  include an analysis of  interest groups
and their behavior.  Given that NEPA/EIS was  instituted to facilitate
compromise among diverse objectives held by various interests,  it  is
relevant to question whether controversy and conflicts have moderated or
intensified.  Does  the EIS process facilitate achievement of a reasonable
balance among competing interests?  Does  the process itself constitute a
reasonable means  to achieve  this end?  As-  explained in the  following
sections, the decentralized, participatory mechanism through which an EIS
is  developed, while not the explicit  intent of NEPA, is  crucial  in terms  of
the size and magnitude of transactions costs  associated with an EIS.
III.  THE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE ASSOCIATED
WITH ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS
Understanding the objectives sought by various  interest groups  and
their attempts to organize and influence political decisions  is  critical in
explaining the performance of the  EIS process.  The logic of collective
action and rent seeking theory have high descriptive relevance  in this
regard.12 This section traces  through these arguments as  they apply  to  the
EIS process.  The Metropolitan Denver Systemwide Environmental  Impact
Statement (MDSEIS) is used for  illustrative purposes. 13
In the Logic of Collective Action Mancur Olson explained the  impetus
for  individuals to organize in order to  express economic or political
power. 14 Two key factors  that  figure in the  success of individuals  in
organizing formal  interest groups are  (1) expected benefits,  i.e.,  the
5magnitude  of value at stake for each individual and  (2) the transactions
costs associated with organization itself.
Benefit/cost analysis can be used to demonstrate  that formal
organizations  are likely to exist for specialized groups with high expected
benefits and few members.  Similarly, the most zealous  individuals  in a
group will  tend to become leaders.  The typical structure of benefits and
costs can account  for the existence of many  "special"  interest groups  and
relatively few "public"  interest groups,  as evidenced in the EIS  process as
well as many other political arenas.  In the case of the MDSEIS,  this
assertion is corroborated by the fact that at public meetings,  90 percent
of the attendees represented special interests whereas only  10 percent
identified themselves  as part of the general citizenry.1 5
The logic of collective action suggests that interest groups will not
mirror public values based on either  "one person equals one vote"  (a
political model)  or  "one dollar one vote"  (an economic model).  Which
notion of value  is used by decision makers  in assessing an EIS has dramatic
implications for particular decisions.  For example, assume  an EIS involves
(1) constructing a dam which will yield net water sales  of $400,000.00 to
each of 5 developers  totaling $2,000,000.00  or  (2) preserving the  river for
rafting so  10,000 people  enjoy recreation valued at  $100.00  for a total  of
$1,000,000.00.  In this  simple example,  a decision maker assigning value
according to  a "one person equals  one vote"  rule would support  the second
option.  The same  decision maker valuing according  to  the  "one dollar
equals one vote"  rule would favor the first alternative.  It is  not clear
which decision would be appropriate assuming decision makers wish to
reflect  the values of all interested parties.
6Rent seeking  theory is  useful  in explaining the behavior of interest
groups once they are  organized.  This model relies on application of
utility theory in the context of political decision making rather  than
market exchange.  Interest groups are simply assumed to exhibit rational
political behavior  in pursuit of specified objectives.  That is, they will
seek decisions or  regulations that benefit them directly, even at  the
expense of other interest or efficiency in general.16 Given a solid notion
of the objectives and decision rule  faced by participants, rational
behavior can be routinely deduced.
The insight of the analyst is  most critical  in specifying the specific
objectives that govern the a particular case.  The following paragraphs
outline  the typical range of interests  involved in EIS  statements,
distinguished both in terms of location and ideology.  The  interest groups
and objectives relevant  to the Metropolitan Denver Systemwide Environmental
Impact Statement  (MDSEIS) are used for illustrative purposes.
Environmental  Interests
Environmentalists have a (largely negative)  stake in large scale
development  (structural water development in the MDSEIS).  Because their
value  systems  are considerably different it is useful to define  two
categories of environmentalists:  (1)  recreationists and (2)
preservationists.  The distinction among environmentalists  is important
because the two views would lead interest groups  to  take very different
strategies in  the EIS process.
As  defined here, recreationists'  value changes in  the environment in
anthropocentric  terms.  That is,  all environmental  factors  are assessed in
terms of their contribution to,  or deterioration of,  the quality of human
7life.  In the case at hand, the  loss  of rafting and fishing opportunities
as  well as aesthetic  resources, are  of particular importance.  New
recreation opportunities afforded by reservoir development would be
included as positives  in a recreationist's impact assessment.  Conceivably,
most of the costs and benefits involved could be monetized through
estimation of willingness to pay.
Preservationists focus  on intrinsic or biocentric rather  than
anthropocentric value.  Preservationists  argue that  species of plant and
animal  life, as well  as geological sites have value  regardless of their
impact  (or lack of impact) on human utility.  This view is  effectively a no
growth or minimum interference objective.  Therefore, any sort of
development is  opposed on principle.  Only  the recreation alternatives
based on low density, unmechanized resource use  are valued by this group.
Local Development Interests
Local development interests, usually misconceived as coherent, are
also key to the  interest group dynamics of  the  EIS process.  In most cases
development interest are diverse;  there is  more intra-group competition and
disagreement than commonly believed.  Divisions within the general  group
usually depend on relative economic pressures for development within
political jurisdictions.
A distinction between development  interests,  critical  to  understanding
the MDSEIS, and relevant  to many natural resources  issues,  is  the
difference between city and suburban interests.  In the  case at hand,
virtually all new water demand originates in the  suburbs, while the bulk of
transmission and treatment infrastructure, as well as  actual water rights
and technical expertise  is  owned by the city of Denver proper.
8Municipal boundaries  make for an interesting, if not consistent
relationship between entities.  Certainly, one can expect  the city and
suburbs  to be allied against environmental  groups and others who oppose
development.  However, when the  issues changes from the goal of development
to  the means of development, municipalities are often transformed from
allies  to adversaries.  Regardless  of their cohesion on the desirability or
inevitability of growth and development per se,  cities and suburbs usually
have serious disagreements on the particulars  of development, which is  part
of a larger, running battle.
Power and independence are often valued in themselves and weighed
against cost considerations.  Consider the degree of cooperation in
transmission and treatment of water.  Do economies of scale and the
flexibility of an integrated system warrant centralized management by
Denver through contractual arrangement with the suburbs?  Or is  the
independence of individual suburban municipalities valuable enough to
forego  the cost advantages mentioned.  Should suburbs  "trust" Denver to
pursue  the lowest-cost water option or would they be wise to withdraw from
cooperation and pursue  independent water supply alternatives  (perhaps
transfers  from agriculture).
Very often cities enjoy a tradition of leadership and power.  City
officials may make  an effort to maintain status and control  in development
decisions,  despite the fact of declining need in their own jurisdiction.
Cities often pay  the price by becoming the quintessential adversary,
attacked by environmentalists and suburbs  alike.  Relative to  suburbs,  the
city proper may bear the burden of extreme visibility and scrutiny even
when the city's actual stake  in the decisions are relatively small.
9If the  city proper  assumes  the role of water developer, which, of an
infinite  number of financial arrangements, will be pursued?  Certainly, the
financial positions of individual jurisdictions motivate development
interests.  Will development  costs be financed through new taxes  (impacting
housing developers and future residents concentrated in the suburbs)  or via
rate  increases  (whereby all current residents share the burden of growth).
If the city subsidizes water development needed for  the  suburbs,  should the
suburbs reciprocate by -contributing  to city hospitals and museums?  Due to
the  fact that political boundaries rarely match impact boundaries,  the
issues associated with natural resource development become political  chips
in  the full  spectrum of issues facing cities and suburbs dealing with
growth and the  environment.
Local Resource Competitors
In any natural resource decision, there will  likely be local resource
competitors who have some  stake  in development by another use type.  In
general,  the position of resource competitors  depends on current and
expected future economic circumstances.  The following paragraphs
illustrate the principle using the example  of agriculture, a direct water
resource competitor on the Front Range  of Colorado.
Assuming farmers wish to maximize profits,  they will use a resource as
long as  its marginal contribution to revenue exceeds its cost.  In the
presence of urban growth, and the absence of water development, water will
likely be bid out of agriculture  into municipal  use.  If farmers  sell water
voluntarily, then by definition, individual  farmers will be  fairly
compensated.  Even so, water may  transfers contribute  to  the decline  in
associated businesses who are not party to  the transaction.
10Farmers encourage water development  insofar  as it contributes  to  their
profitability.  However, their incentives depend on macroeconomic
circumstances.  During boom periods, farmers may wish to expand and obtain
additional water at relatively low cost and therefore would support
development.  In recessionary periods,  some may wish to  sell water rights
to relieve  financial burden.  Under these  conditions, individual farmers
may oppose water development  in the hope  that their property may become
more attractive  to buyers.
Regional Development Interests
Typically there  are other communities within a region (as  defined by
impact boundaries)  that are  indirectly impacted by the proposed actions
addressed in an EIS.  Neoclassical economists often exclude consideration
of indirect  (secondary) economic effects, because under certain conditions
(i.e.,  full employment) secondary impacts effect the distribution of
benefits and costs but not net gain.  However,  from an interest group
perspective, the distribution of the  regional economic pie is  more
important than its size.
In the MDSEIS, regional development  interests are  typified by Western
slope water interests.  This group supports development in general but
their main concern is  with the distribution of growth.  In concrete  terms,
both agricultural and municipal  interests on the Western slope are
concerned that immediate water development by metro-Denver will hamper
future  development in their region of the state.
This argument could also be extended to  other states within the
Colorado River region.  Certainly as  a potential competitor, California has
a stake  in water development  in Colorado  insofar as  it  lessens  or enhances
11water related opportunities  for California in the future.  The single
factor that characterizes  regional development interests is  that their
objectives include consideration of secondary as well as  primary net
benefits from future water development.
Summary
Formally, the simple model  of objectives pursued by interest groups
typically involved in  the EIS process can be represented as follows:
n
(1)  UEj  - f(Zgi, rm)
i-1
where,
UE - utility of environmentalists  of type j, where j - 1, 2 and 1 -
recreationists and 2 - preservationists
g - growth in jurisdiction i - l...n
r - recreation opportunities  of type m, where m - 1, 2 and 1 -
mechanized and/or high density and 2 - unmechanized, low density.
Clearly,
SUE1  0 6UE1 > 0 6UE1 > 0
6gi  Srl 6r2
6UE2 <  6UE2 < o  6UE2 > O
Sgi  6rl 6r2
(2)  UDi - v  (gi, ki,  ei)
where,
uDi - utility of development  officials in jurisdiction
gi - growth  in jurisdiction i including secondary  impacts
ki - jurisdictional power/independence
ei - excess of municipal revenues over expenditures  in region i
12In  this case,
sUDi > 0  SUDi > o  SUDi > 0
6 gi  6si  6ei
(3)  UC - w (p)
where,
C - utility of resource competitor
p - price  of resource
And:
6UC > O  under circumstances of industry contraction
6p
SUC < o  under circumstances of industry expansion
Sp
Section II  yields  two key insights.  First,  the  range of goals sought
by  the  interest groups  involved in the EIS  is extremely diverse.  Equation
(2) in itself captures the  diverse goals  of city, suburban and regional
developers distinguished by location.  Insofar as objectives  reflect value
systems,  it  is  clear  that interest groups are involved in a fundamentally
moral disagreement.
Second, in accordance with the logic of collective action, organized
interest groups will not mirror the general public, in  terms of either  "one
person equals one vote" nor  "one dollar equals one vote".  Organized
interest will  tend to represent  "special"  rather than "public"  interests.
Moreover, because of their perception of the  stakes  involved, the most
zealous individuals tend to hold disproportionate power within interest
groups.  Moderates rarely become leaders.
A clear understanding of the structure of interest groups and their
diverse objects is  the first step  in understanding the performance of the
13EIS process.  The next section focuses on strategic behavior by organized
interest groups and their interplay in the context of the EIS process.  The
role of information is  central in this  regard.  Uncertainty allows interest
groups  to transform a fundamentally moral disagreement into factual
dispute.  A contest of wills becomes a contest of information.
IV.  STRATEGIC USE OF INFORMATION
AND TRANSACTIONS  COST
NEPA and the  EIS process are  intended to reduce uncertainty by
improving information about economic and environmental tradeoffs.
Ironically, as  this section explains,  the interplay among interest groups
in the  EIS process actually serves  to promote increasingly divergent views
on factual matters.  Although thoroughly unintended, uncertainty and
transactions costs may increase dramatically.  Uncertainty comes into play
via an unavoidable element in  impact assessment:  forecasting.  Successful
planning, indeed the choice as  to the appropriate mix of preservation and
development depends directly on one's vision of the future.
In the case of the MDSEIS,  impact assessment depends heavily on
forecasts of population growth and distribution, water conservation
potential  (elasticity of demand),  and water supply available  through
nonstructural means (primarily via exchanges and transfers of water out of
agriculture).  Each of these factors  is critical  to  an assessment of the
"appropriate"  level of development and associated environmental damage.
Unfortunately these elements are  impossible  to foresee with absolute
accuracy.
14The principle of diminishing marginal returns applies to  forecasting.
In the  limit, additional time  and effort devoted to forecasting does not
guarantee any improvement in accuracy or certainty.  In the  final analysis,
one can not unequivocally prove or disprove many estimates key to  the
decision.  If the problem were one  of risk rather than uncertainty,
expected values could be calculated and used to  guide decision makers
according to whether they are  risk averse, neutral or risk seeking.
Unfortunately in most cases probability distributions  do not exist.
Uncertainty in forecasting creates  the opportunity for  interest groups
to  strategically manipulate  information.  Each interest group may fabricate
scenarios of the future that supports their particular position.  Moral
arguments are transformed into disagreements regarding the  "facts".
Contrary to popular belief, additional information does not necessarily
increase knowledge or understanding.  This section argues that uncertainty
and the potential for manipulation constitute crucial elements  in producing
the  enormous transactions costs  often associated with impact assessments.
Strategic use of information by interest groups often manifests itself
in the EIS process  in the  form of  (1) information overload and (2)
adversarial use of extreme alternatives.  These two strategies  are bound to
create  transactions costs in the  form of expense and delay.  Of ultimate
importance, the  transactions costs  that result may be of a magnitude that
threatens to stymie decision making consonant with the policy intent of
NEPA.
Information Overload
Ironically, in pursuit of certainty about the  impacts of natural
resource decision, the  EIS process often results  in information overload
15which may in fact increase uncertainty.  Creators of NEPA legislation never
foresaw, nor  intended to  require, the voluminous dissertations that typify
impact statements  today. 17 The quantity of information available  to an EIS
is not limited;  its  quality is.  In fact, quantity itself may become a
problem insofar as  it may obscure  the most relevant data and contributes to
confusion'and delay.
The factors contributing to information overload are directly
attributable to  the incentive structure faced by  interest groups and the
rules  governing their  interaction.  In general, information overload
reflects  the diversity of interests  involved and each group's desire  to
have all viewpoints favorable  to their position presented and considered.
In this sense  information overload reflects the complexity of the  conflict.
The problem is  compounded by the fact that an EIS may require
"comprehensive analysis" of alternatives.  Coupled with the  threat of
litigation, this  standard serves  to  reinforce the  tendency towards
information overload.
However, basic conflict alone  is not enough to produce information
overload.  It must be  fueled by uncertainty.  Uncertainty serves  to  magnify
the conflict among interest groups by allowing information to multiply
through manipulation.  By combining a set of forecasts that reflect their
view of the world, interest groups can manufacture  "definitive" scenarios
of the future and "prove" the appropriate  level of development.  Technical
support for-such scenarios can be garnered because experts  themselves
disagree  due to objective considerations, personal convictions,  and the
"marketplace for  ideas".  The "marketplace for  ideas" refers  to
professionals who  supply the  theoretical support  for any idea that demands
16a high enough asking price.  In this case  the objective is  to provide
information for a particular argument rather than an objective  quest for
"truth".
The demand for particular types of information explains why a new set
of interests, dependent only on the  EIS process  itself, emerges.
Consultants, and the  technicians charged with obtaining forecasts
(specifically,  forecasts  favorable to  their employer) become a new interest
group.  Assuming the objective of consultants  is  to maximize  income, and
given compensation is usually related to  time spent, the  impetus  to  engage
in protracted and complicated studies becomes  clear.
Experts find it even easier to discredit  estimates put forth by
opposing interest groups  than it  is  to fabricate an original estimate.
Because forecasting is inherently uncertain, the  implicit rewards in
analysis are  for "informed skepticism".  An expert is  bound to  promote
his/her reputation by questioning estimates rather than by positing
answers.
Due  to uncertainty, there is no  limit to  the rounds of criticism and
refutation interest groups and their hired technicians can impose  upon each
other.  Impact assessment becomes  a reiterative process  of massaging
forecasts and constructing assumptions that produce  "facts"  that support a
group's preferred position while exposing the estimates of others  to a
barrage of criticism emphasizing their weakness.
Because, as with most monumental developments, scientists don't have
the option to  conduct and repeat objective experiments  that will  lay some
assertions to  rest,  the disagreements  are essentially unresolvable and
throw doubt on the  full range of information attendant  to the EIS  process.
17Instead of reducing uncertainty,  the proliferation of estimates exacerbates
the  information problem.  Decision making becomes bogged down in
information overload.  Considerable  time and expense must be devoted to
developing, cataloging and criticizing information.  In short, transactions
costs explode.
Support of Extreme Scenarios
The second way in which game strategic behavior manifests  itself is  in
the adversarial rather than cooperative stance taken by interest groups,
especially in  the form of supporting extreme rather than moderate scenarios
depicting the future.  Unfortunately, this  is  in direct opposition to  the
purpose of NEPA which is  to promote  compromise.
This strategy may be understood in terms  of the  standard payoff matrix
associated with noncooperative game models.18  The payoff matrix relevant
to a typical EIS  process  is  shown in Figure 1.  For simplicity, only two
interest groups are represented but  the model  is  applicable  to  the n group
case.  Using 0 as a base utility level  for mutual compromise (NEPA's
preferred outcome),  the  remaining possibilities can be evaluated on ordinal
grounds.
Position taken by Environmentalists
Compromise  Extreme
Position Ta?:an  Compromise  (0, 0)  (--,  ++)
By Developers
Extreme  (++, --)  (-,  )
Figure 1.  Payoff Matrix Relevant to  the EIS Process.
18If developers  take an extreme position and environmentalists
compromise, developers benefit and environmentalists suffer  relative to
mutual compromise.  The reverse case also applies.  If both groups  take
extreme positions, delay results and both groups  lose relative  to
compromise  insofar as all  interests  are left with considerable  time and
money invested with no  indication, much less any guarantee  that any
eventual decision will be  to their  liking.
A more precise definition of preference for extremism would involve
weighing expected benefits/costs  of development against  the expected
benefits/costs of preservation, minus the costs associated with delay
itself.  In any case, as  the transactions costs associated with achieving a
final  solution rise, the payoff associated with taking an extreme position
declines.
For developers one would expect  the resulting preference order  to be
RD  (++,  -- ) > RD  (0, 0) > RD (-, -) > RD  (--,  ++).  For environmentalists,
the preference order  is RE  (--,  ++) > RE (0, 0) > RE  (-, -) > RE  (++, --).
Despite the  desirability of compromise from a aggregate point of view,
extremity  is  rational for  the individual.  This is  the classic prisoners'
dilemma.  This game leads  to the Pareto inferior stable equilibrium of
(-,  -).
Again, it is  uncertainty that allows-interest groups  to garner support
for extreme scenarios.  Typically, several forecasts must be combined in
order to  generate a scenario depicting future conditions and their
implications for  resource use.  Interest groups  can construct extreme
scenarios by using the high or low estimate for each key forecast.
Compilation of several extreme estimates compounds the extremity in the
19final  scenario.
For example,  in the draft MDSEIS, a set of forecasts have been
produced for population growth, conservation and nonstructural water
supply.19 Forecasts of unconstrained water demand  (due to population
growth),  range from 190,300  acre feel  (a.f.)  to  223,900 a.f.  Estimates of
potential conservation range from 15,000 a.f.  to 99,000 a.f.  And yields
from nonstructural  supplies  (transfers and exchanges)  are projected to be
anywhere  from 23,800 a.f.  to  41,800 a.f.  These forecasts can be combined
to produce scenarios of demand for structural water supplies ranging from
approximately 50,000  to  185,000 acre  feet  in the year 2010.
The resulting four-fold difference  in forecasts of water demand to be
met through structural means  indicates  the great uncertainty about Denver's
water future, and reflects the  relative ease with which interest groups can
construct extreme scenarios.  The  "truth",  to be manifest at a much later
date,  is likely intermediate  to these  extremes.  Extreme positions are  also
evident in public meetings.  Participants are much more  likely to  espouse
an extreme view of future conditions  and support severe conservation or
all-out development  rather than moderate combinations of the  two.20
Extreme scenarios  impose transactions costs  on the EIS process because
they exacerbate  the technical problem of analyzing alternatives. As
demonstrated above, the  extreme scenarios supported by diverse  interest
groups have no common denominator  for comparison.  Adversarial use of
extreme scenarios widens  rather than narrows the  gap between interest
groups,  and impedes  informed decision making.
Transactions  Costs
To summarize  the preceding paragraphs,  fundamental uncertainty allows
20interest groups  to manipulate  information key to an EIS.  Manipulation is
most often manifest in the form of information overload and support of
extreme and adversarial scenarios.  The result may be enormous  transaction
costs  in terms of delay and expense.  For example, as  of late  1987
approximately  $40 million and six years time have been devoted to  the
MDSEIS and the effort remains  to be completed.21 Despite the resources
committed to consideration of a full range of alternatives and impacts,
interest groups still disagree vehemently as  to a reasonable approach to
water supply.
In this case  (and many like  it)  interest groups agree on only one
thing.  The current state of affairs  is  unacceptable.  The divergence in
views unmitigated by  the EIS  is evidenced by the  fact that despite
substantial  input by environmental groups,  the Environmental Caucus
considers  the  draft EIS  grossly inadequate.  Developers,  intent on going
forward with structural projects,  feel the  financial strain of the study
(funded largely by municipal water providers) and still face  the  threat of
litigation.  Clearly,  the conflict between interest groups has not been
ameliorated by the EIS process.  In fact,  tensions have heightened.22
Game strategic behavior can produce  the transactions costs  described
only under a sufficiently diffuse decision rule.  A dictator  (exercising
the most concentrated decision rule),  can ignore  interest group input  to  a
large  extent.  In contrast, transformation of the EIS process  into
participatory  decision making requiring comprehensive analysis, effectively
establishes unanimity as a decision rule.  Unfortunately, as noted by
theorists diverse  interests coupled with a unanimity rule allows for
"voting  by veto" by which any single group can impose and enforce
21inaction.23 Under these  conditions, participatory decision making allows
strategic behavior to  produce transaction costs  of a magnitude that promise
to  stymie decision making.24
The problem can be  illustrated in  the context of Buchanan and
Tullock's  public choice model.2 5 Referring to  Figure 2, prior to  the
advent of NEPA/EIS, the decision rule governing natural resource decisions'
lay in  the range of D1. Developers exercised considerable discretion
(imposing substantial  external costs on environmental  interests),  and
incurred low decision making costs.
When an existing decision rule results  in pervasive inefficiency or
exposes one or more  interests  to  extreme pressure and is  perceived as
unfair, the  impetus for institutional change emerges. 26 Conceivably, NEPA
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Figure  2.  Representative external and  transactions costs  of  alternative
decision  rules.
22inefficient and unfair in  terms of the external costs imposed on
environmental interests.  Unfortunately the "solution" may have become one
of the opposite extreme.  Although not the explicit intent of NEPA, the EIS
process has  evolved into a decision rule effectively requiring consensus,
like D2. External costs are reduced but decision making costs
(transactions costs) have reached unprecedented heights.
As  it stands,  some natural resource decisions are burdened with undue
pressure, this  time in the  form of transactions costs.  As  a result,
considerable demand exists for institutional innovation.  The next section
outlines policy innovations  (specific to the MDSEIS and
development/preservation decisions  in general) that hold promise in
balancing the tradeoff between external and transactions costs.
V.  POLICY INNOVATIONS
The previous  sections explain why, through a combination of rent
seeking, uncertainty and broad veto power,  the EIS process may produce
enormous transactions costs which impede decision making.  Rather than
fostering the compromise clear  in NEPA intent,  the positions  of interest
groups may diverge, rather than converge as a result of the  EIS process.
Insofar as  the specific form of this  institutional arrangement is
imposing serious,  nonproductive pressure on natural resource-decisions and
perceived as  inefficient and/or unfair, the decision rules and particular
policies guiding the process are brought into question.  The impetus exists
to  devise a viable solution to the problem of exorbitant decision making
23costs, without imposing undue external cost.  The problem becomes one of
institutional design.  Hurwicz2 7 defines  the problem as follows:
"given a social choice correspondence expressing the  societal
goals or desiderata,  find game rules  [i.e.,  an outcome  function
and a specification of permissible moves  (behaviors-messages and
actions)]  implementing (in a noncooperative game equilibrium
sense) that correspondence, subject to  the validity of
commitments,  as well as  to restrictions on message space size and
on the complexity of computations  to be performed by
participants.  It  is,  of course, quite likely that only an
approximate  implementation is  possible"  (p. 401).
Referring to Figure 2, at  first glance one might suggest  that a
moderate  (but more concentrated like D3 ) decision rule be innovated because
in this  case,  a rule  intermediate between dictatorship and unanimity is
cost effective.  However, upon closer inspection the general problem is
considerably more complex.
First it must be recognized that the nature and incidence of decision
making and transaction costs  are fundamentally a function of the  initial
rights structure.28 For example  as defined here,  developers have the
initial rights, subject to  conditions  imposed by the EIS.  As a result the
external costs  fall primarily on preservation interests  and transactions
costs  are born by developers.  Alternatively however, one may imagine
environmentalists  have the  initial rights  (to preservation) whereby
developers would bear the external costs of environmentalists decisions and
environmentalists would incur the  transactions costs of  including other
parties  in the decision.  As  depicted in Figure  2 not only would the
24referent groups switch, one would also expect the shape  of these curves  to
change as well.
Another complicating, but extremely  important factor,  is that the
costs shown are  implicitly weighted according to  some  "social welfare
function".29 That is,  policy decisions are made considering the costs  that
accrue  to various  groups, and also according  to  the relative weight society
affords each group or type of costs.  Conceivably, if dollar costs  remain
unchanged and the  social welfare function shifted  (e.g.,  to  assign weight
based on number of people versus number of dollars)  the effective  cost





Figure 3.-  Case specific costs associated with alternative decision rules.
25 25There are  two,  less abstract, reasons why the appropriate decision
rule  may change.  Their implications are shown graphically  in Figure 3.
The weighted external and transaction are shown here  as E1 and N1
respectively.  Total costs  (T1)  indicate a moderate decision rule of D1 is
appropriate.
However, the magnitude  of potential external costs varies according to
the natural resource decision.  In  the case of serious,  irreversible
externalities  (like toxic waste contamination) external  costs look like E2.
Obviously considering total costs  (T2 ) the appropriate decision rule  is  not
moderate.  Under these  circumstances incurring the  extra transaction costs
associated with the diffuse decision rule  (D2) is  justified in order  to
avoid exorbitant external cost.
Finally, the level of transactions costs may vary according  to  the
specific institutional form.  This  is  the  issue to  which this paper is
addressed.  Given external costs are  significant but not infinite  (El),
what institutional  innovations would lower transactions costs  (N2 ), thereby
shifting the  total cost curve  (T3 ) and allowing participatory decision
making to operate at  lower cost  (R3).  This  is  the conceptual approach
applied to  the specific problems  in the  EIS process  discussed here.
Pursuit of improvement  in policy must take place in the context of
institutional arrangements  that may actually be  implemented rather than
based on some  ideal state of "nirvana economics". 30 The question becomes,
what modifications in  the  EIS process can realistically be undertaken, that
will give participants the  incentive  to reach a socially acceptable balance
among competing  interests  at reasonable decision making costs.  In the
following paragraphs policy innovations are proposed that address the  three
26problem areas  of (1) diverse objectives,  (2) uncertainty, and  (3) diffuse
veto power.
Rectifying the problems  that result from diverse objectives  can be
viewed in the  context of internalizing externalities.  In  the limit all
interests would be merged into one firm, thereby integrating diverse
objectives  into a coherent whole.  In realistic terms however,  the value
systems  of interest groups  are too  divergent  for one entity  to be capable,
or desirous of, representing all factions.
However, there  is one  case when internalization may be possible.  It
may be appropriate  to combine city and suburban areas  into  a metro-wide
governmental authority.  Aligning political and impact boundaries makes
ultimate sense for decision making.  In merging municipal interests,
jurisdictional conflicts based on the desire for power per se would be
eliminated and city officials would still be able to  represent a coherent
set of substantive objectives.
Uncertainty and the need for forecasts cannot be eliminated from the
EIS process.  But they can be managed in a way that  reduces  the  probability
of extreme  scenarios and information overload.  One  possibility is  to
modify the  requirement of "comprehensive"  analysis.  In the  face of
uncertainty, the range of potential  analyses is  limited only by the
analysts' imagination of assumptions  and combinations thereof.  To sanction
comprehensive analysis under these circumstance absolutely guarantees
information overload.
Assuming external  costs are not extremely serious and irreversible,
the entire process  should focus on "reasonable  and moderate"  ranges of
information.  The problem of extreme alternatives  can be reduced by giving
27analytical and legal weight to moderate rather than extreme forecasts of
key variables.  Even less weight should be given  to  scenarios which
represent the  cumulative effect of several extreme  forecasts.
Using  the "reasonable range"  concept to  focus  on moderate estimates
can effectively limit the information considered in an EIS  to that which is
useful  in content and manageable in size.  The result will be to  reduce
transactions costs and increase  the probability of achieving natural
resource decisions consonant with the policy intent of NEPA.
Institutional innovations  designed to modify decision rules to make
decision making more or  less diffuse are  far reaching and must be
considered carefully.  In terms  of social choice theory, the  idea is to
devise a constitution for decision making that all parties agree will be
fair and acceptable when applied repeatedly, even though in one particular
instance it may work to a particular group's disadvantage. 3 1 That  is, the
decision rule  should not be devised in the context of one  particular EIS.
Rather it must be a general rule applicable  to  all potential EIS's.
An institutional arrangement that holds some promise  in this regard
relies  on the concept of a  negotiation team.  The idea is  to  develop a
small committee made up of representatives  of each type of  interest group
relevant  to a particular EIS.  The negotiation  team would be authorized to
perform a variety of functions  including (1)  make recommendations
concerning fruitful avenues  for  inquiry in an EIS  (i.e.,  suggest the kinds
of information that would illuminate  rather than obscure  avenues for
compromise);  and (2)  negotiate and make formal statements  regarding an
acceptable compromise among competing  interests.
A variation on the negotiation team theme was  tried pursuant to  the
28MDSEIS.  The Governors Roundtable was made up of individuals  representing
diverse interests.  This group was able to arrive a set  of recommendations
that constitute significant steps  in achieving creative solutions to
complicated problems.  Unfortunately the group was not  formally empowered
and did not have the support of their constituencies.32
One may question whether, from an intertemporal perspective,  it would
be productive to have national representatives  of various interests who
would negotiate repeatedly over time about various natural resources
issues.  Would standing, long term development and preservation
representatives be better able  to indicate  the relative priority of many
decisions?  Would the  incentive to compromise  emerge, given the
negotiations recur on a continuing basis?  Studying this possibility in the
context of game theory constitutes an important  item on a research agenda
for the  future.
In conclusion, understanding  (1) the nature and objectives  of interest
groups  involved in an EIS,  (2) the role of uncertainty in game strategic
behavior and (3) the costs associated with alternative decision rules,  are
critical  in addressing the problems associated with the  EIS process.
Systematic analysis in the context of interest group and game theory
clarifies  the  incentives involved and provides  the basis  for intelligent
discourse  about potential solutions.
Institutional arrangements are not fixed and constant.  Human
resourcefulness  is.  Policies that emerge  to  regulate natural resource
decisions must not be automatically accepted as representing the public's
interests  or rejected as  figments of political vagary.  The performance of
specific institutions depends on the choice domain open (and closed) to
29individuals under certain circumstances, including  their opportunities to
manipulate  the system.  By exploring  the factors that underlie the
performance of institutional arrangements,  analysts are better able to
determine decision rules  that yield an incentive structure consonant with
the goal of balancing competing  interests  in a dynamic context.
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